This chapter critically evaluates the TCE literature on cross-border business activity to evaluate to what extent this empirical literature actually allows to support or refute TCE-based arguments, and to provide directions for future work research. We identify four major challenges: 1) The level of analysis used to proxy transaction costs, 2) contextual drivers of transaction costs, especially in emerging economies, 3) theoretical ambiguity of TCE arguments with respect to distance and experience, and 4) the assumption that JVs are a flexible (low risk) mode of operation. This discussion leads to suggestions how to design empirical research more consistent with the statements of the theory. 
INTRODUCTION
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a probably the most frequently used theoretical foundation for studies of joint ventures (JVs) and strategic alliances (see reviews by Tsang, 2000; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004; Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell, 2005; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Brouthers, 2013) . TCE addresses the question how firms organize their transactions with other firms, and, consequently, where they draw their organizational boundaries. TCE provides a theoretical grounding to analyze the choice of governance structures, for example between JVs and other organizational forms, such as licensing, contracts or whollyowned subsidiaries (WOS). However, despite its parsimony and its popularity, TCE has also been frequently critiqued and is arguably the most misinterpreted theory in international business research (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) .
Moreover, empirical findings on some of the constructs derived from TCE find inconsistent results. While many studies support the arguments of TCE, other studies find insignificant or even opposite results (Zhao et al., 2004; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007) .
This chapter critically evaluates the TCE literature on cross-border business activity with two aims; firstly to evaluate to what extend this empirical literature actually allows to support or refute TCE-based arguments, and secondly to provide directions for future work analyzing crossborder strategic alliances using a TCE perspective. The next section briefly introduces the key theoretical concepts and ideas of TCE that have influenced international business research. We focus in particular on the work of Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Anderson and Gatignon (1986) , Pruthi, 2009) . Hence, the first challenge for applying TCE is to identify the TC characteristics of strategic alliances (Meyer, 1998: chapter 4) . In a strategic alliance, business partners engage in complex bundles of often interconnected transactions; and governance structures are chosen for these sets of transactions. Hence, it is appropriate to apply TCE to sets of transactions between pairs (or groups) of business partners, and hence focus on the relationship between two firms as unit of analysis. It gets however more complex in the case of equity joint ventures (JVs), 1 a specific form of strategic alliance. In a JV, a new organization is created that in turn has separate (but not independent) sets of transactions with each of its parents, each being subject to different
TCs. This complexity created challenges for theory development in international business.
Hubert Anderson and Erin Gatignon (1986) address these conceptual challenges by mapping alternative organizational forms on a single scale that reflects the tradeoff between control and resource commitment that an MNE would face when establishing operations abroad. They then position seventeen types of entry modes on this scale, with non-exclusive, non-restrictive contracts being low control, wholly owned subsidiary being high control, and various forms of contracts as well as joint ventures taking intermediate positions. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) draw directly on Williamson to motivate the determinants of firm's preference of high-control as opposed to low-control modes: transaction-specific assets, external uncertainty, internal uncertainty and free-riding potential. Table 1 presents the propositions pertaining to each of the four constructs. In addition to the direct effects, they propose that the joint effects of external uncertainty and asset specificity positively interact to increase TCs, which induces foreign investors to seek higher levels of control (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) . 9 dependent variable includes JVs or another form of alliance between foreign and local partner(s),
and 2) the authors use TCE based arguments to motivate their study, for example by using concepts such as asset specificity and uncertainty. Like earlier reviews (Zhao et al., 2004 , Geyskens et al., 2006 , Brouthers and Hennart, 2007 we note that transaction frequency is an important theoretical construct of TCE that has not been analyzed sufficiently in the empirical literature. We thus do not address transaction frequency in our review.
*** Table 2 here ***
3.1.Asset Specificity
Asset specificity has been proxied using both archival and survey based data. The most popular proxies are firm level measures such as the ratio of R&D and/or advertising expenditure over total sales at either industry or firm level (Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Chen and Hu, 2002; Chen and Hennart, 2002; Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 2007) . However, these same variables also have been used to proxy different constructs such as information asymmetry or resource endowments, which limit their explanatory power with respect to a particular theory.
Alternatively, Gomes-Casseres (1989 , 1990 uses business process customization proxied by intra-firm trade, while Hennart (1991) introduce a resource-industry dummy for the same purpose. All these measures capture asset specificity only indirectly, and make somewhat speculative assumptions as to how the characteristics of a firm influence the types of transactions that this firm would undertake.
Rigorous testing should measure TCs at the level of transactions or inter-firm relationships.
Hence, several studies employed survey based measures on the value of firm specific know-how and tacit nature of know-how (Kim and Hwang, 1992) , on professional skills, specialized knowhow and customization (Erramilli and Rao, 1993) , on contributed technological expertise, risk of abuse by potential JV partners, and contributed unique skills (Rajan and Pangarkar, 2000) , on technology and management transfer (Meyer, 2001 ) and on human asset specificity, proprietary products/service and dedicated asset specificity (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2003 ).
Studies using firm-level proxies provide mixed findings. Many studies find high R&D intensity to increase the preference for WOS over JVs (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Chen and Hu, 2002; Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 2007 ). Yet, non-significant relationships are found by Gomes-Casseres (1989 , 1990 , Hennart (1991) , Taylor et al. (1998 ), Meyer (2001 ), Brouthers (2002 and Chen and Hennart (2002) while a positive relationship between asset specificity and JVs is found by Palenzuela and Bobillo (1999) . Inconsistent findings are also found for advertising intensity. While Gatignon and Anderson (1988) , and Gomes-Casseres (1989; 1990) find that MNEs prefer WOS to JVs when the degree of advertising intensity is high, Kogut and Singh (1988) , Hennart (1991) and Chen and Hu (2002) find insignificant relationships.
Survey-based studies find more consistent support. Kim and Hwang (1992) find that firms prefer WOS as opposed JVs when the level of tacit nature of know-how is high, while Rajan and Pangarkar (2000) find multiple indicators of firm specific assets to be positively associated with high control modes. Similarly Brouthers et al. (2003) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) find asset specificity measured at the transaction level to be positively related with WOS as opposed to JVs in manufacturing and service firms. However, Meyer (2001) fails to find evidence that technology and management transfer would influence the choice between WOS and JVs.
3.2.Internal Uncertainty
Internal uncertainty relates to uncertainties that arise from incomplete knowledge about partners'
future actions, what Williamson (1975; 1985) refers to as opportunism, and Verbeke and Graidanus (2009) as 'bounded reliability'. The most commonly used empirical constructs for internal uncertainty are cultural distance and international experience (Hennart, 1991; Agarwal, 1994; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Chen and Hu, 2002; Chiao, Lo and Yu, 2010; Kuo, Kao, Chang and Chiu, 2012) . The assumption here is that the more 'distant' a business partner, and the less experienced a firm is in dealing with that sort of business partner, the higher the likelihood of unexpected or opportunistic behaviors of the partner.
Cultural distance has often been measured by Kogut and Singh (1988) 's composite index based on Hofstede's four cultural dimensions (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Agarwal, 1994; Erramilli, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Chen and Hu, 2002; Cho and Padmanabhan, 2005) . Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez (2013) measure cultural distance by Schwartz and GLOBE's approach. A few studies proxy distance by the geographical locations in which the investments are located (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Quer, Claver and Rienda, 2007) . In terms of findings, a majority of studies such as Gatignon and Anderson (1988) , Erramilli and Rao (1993) , Agarwal (1994), Hennart and Larimo (1998) , Taylor et al., (1998), Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) and Quer et al. (2007) find that cultural distance have a positive impact on preference for JVs over WOS, whereas Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) , Meyer (2001) , Chang, Kao, Kuo and Chiu, (2012) and International experience has been proxied with secondary data along four dimensions: length, scope, diversity and intensity (Clarke, Tamaschke and Liesch, 2013) . 2 The length of international experience refers to the number of years since the establishment of the first foreign subsidiary (Erramilli, 1991; Hennart, 1991; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Contractor and Kundu, 1998; Cho and Padmanabhan, 2005; Meyer and Li, 2009 ). The scope of international experience is measured by the number of countries in which the parents have established subsidiaries (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kuo et al., 2012) . Diversity of international experience is captured by the breath of firm's experience across its various products and distribution channels. Intensity of international experience refers to the volume of cross-border activities and is often measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries prior to the observed investment (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kuo et al., 2012) . Moreover, Agarwal (1994) indirectly measures international experience with the proportion of assets in foreign countries.
Empirical findings related to international experience tend to be mixed. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) , Hennart (1991) , Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) , Chu and Anderson (1992) , Contractor and Kundu (1998) and Kuo et al. (2012) find that firms with limited or no international experience tend to prefer JVs as opposed to WOS, while Rajan and Pangarkar (2000) find that international experience encourages high control (WOS and majority JVs) as opposed to low control modes (equal and minority JVs). In contrast, Erramilli (1991) and Chiao et al. (2010) find a reverse relationship and Kogut and Singh (1988), Agarwal (1994) , and Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) find non-significant relationship. Li and Meyer (2009) et al., 2003) and the costs of search, contracting and enforcement (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003) . These studies also provide mixed results. While Brouthers et al. (2003) find that the impact of internal uncertainty is non-significant, Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) find internal uncertainty to be positively related with WOS as opposed to JVs for service firms. Overall, the findings on the impacts of internal uncertainty on organizational form have been far from consistent, an issue that we return to later.
3.3.External Uncertainty
External (or environmental) uncertainty has been operationalized in a number of different ways.
Some early studies focus on country risk, operationalized for example using the classification system of Goodnow and Hansz (1972) (Anderson and Gatignon, 1988; Agarwal, 1994) . Quer et al. (2007) approach country risk using a classification of countries based on CESCE. Several studies rely on survey data to directly measure country risk, for example, risk of converting and repatriating profits, nationalization risk, as well as political, social and economic stability 13 (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers et al., 2003) . Further on, Klein et al.
(1990) proxy country risk with managerial perceptions on volatility and diversity surrounding a particular transaction.
While Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Agarwal (1994) External uncertainty has also been proxied by market uncertainty or market potential for a firm's product or service (Agarwal, 1994; Taylor et al., 1998; Brouthers, 2002; Chen and Hu, 2002; Cui and Jiang, 2009) . Most of these studies support the argument that market potential in the host country increases the preference of Western parent firms to choose WOS as opposed to JVs (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1991; Agarwal, 1994; Taylor et al., 1998; Chen and Hu, 2002) , while Brouthers (2002) finds a non-significant relationship. However, in a recent study, Cui and Jiang (2009) find that Chinese firms prefer JVs over WOS when entering high potential market.
CHALLENGES TO EMPIRICALLY TESTING TCE ON JVS
Despite its popularity as a foundation for empirical research, the application of TCE to JVs and strategic alliances faces major challenges that have not been appropriately addressed in the empirical literature. These challenges in designing a TCE-based empirical study explain at least in part the lack of consistency in the results of empirical research. In this section, we elaborate four challenges for empirical tests of TCE arguments on JVs and strategic alliances: 1) the level of analysis used to proxy transaction costs, 2) contextual drivers of transaction costs, especially in emerging economies, 3) theoretical ambiguity of TCE arguments with respect to distance and experience, and 4) the assumption that JVs are a flexible (low risk) mode of operation.
The Testing of Transaction Level Theory TCE with Firm Level Data
TCE is by definition concerned with the organization of transactions, or sets of transactions, between or within firms. Hence, of primary interest are the characteristics of transactions (Andersen, 1997; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 Madhok, 1997; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Tsang, 2006) , and the methodologically most rigorous approach would measure TC at the level of transactions. However, this is virtually impossible because a rigorous test would require not only the actual TCs but also those of the next best organizational form that the firm did not choose (Meyer, 2001) . Moreover, such a test would require ex-ante information on both partners, and the JV operation itself (preferably the contribution from both parents as intended at the outset).
Some scholars use perceptional measures obtained from managers (Brouthers et al., 2003) , but even this approach is imperfect because of discrepancies between managers' perceptions of TC and actually measured costs (Buckley and Chapman, 1997).
Hence, most studies use data at higher level of aggregation, such as the firm, the industry, or the country, to proxy the characteristics of the transactions that the authors presume the firm would conduct in the given context. While it can be theoretically argued why certain types of firms would undertake certain types of transactions, the use of data at levels of aggregation above the transaction creates measurement biases likely to distort the results (Hennart, 1991) . The most striking example is asset specificity. Several studies proxy asset specificity by the R&D or advertising intensity of the firm or by the pertinent industry (Hennart, 1991; Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 2007; Chiao et al., 2010) . Only few studies operationalize asset specificity at the transaction level (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers et al., 2003) . Such a mismatch of the level of analysis is likely a cause of inconsistent findings for the relationship between asset specificity and organizational form, as discussed above.
characteristics of a focal firm, typically the foreign investor. They thus implicitly assume that the local partners' contributions play no role in MNE's entry mode strategy (Hennart, 2009) -Casseres, 1989; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Hennart, 2009) . These local owners of resources would be interested in getting a deal that enables them to best exploit their resources.
Hence, studies that neglect the interests of local partners who control these complementary resources may lead to misleading managerial implications (Hennart, 2009) . In other words, observed organizational forms are the outcome of negotiations between (at least) two partners.
Thus, when choosing an organizational form, MNEs may have their preferences, but the observed organization form also depends on the transaction costs faced by the local partner.
This discussion highlights that future research needs to be much more careful in measuring TCs.
Firstly, TCs need to be proxied as close to the actual transaction (or sets of transactions) as feasible. Secondly, studies need to incorporate the TCs incurred by all partners of a transaction or an alliance, not only those incurred by the focal firm.
Contextual Drivers of TCs in Emerging Economies
Studies that focus on firm characteristics to proxy TC implicitly assume that TCs are not affected by variations in the external environment, such as institutions shaping the efficiency of markets (Meyer and Peng, 2005) . This assumption may not hold true when applying TCE in emerging markets such as China or Central Eastern Europe (CEE). The core elements of TCE such as opportunism and uncertainty are major concerns in emerging markets (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson and Peng, 2005) . However, these drivers of TC are associated primarily with idiosyncrasies of the environment, and only secondarily with the characteristics of the firms (Luo, 2007) . Hence, focusing on the sources of TCs that are the main focus of earlier empirical research, such as asset specificity and internal uncertainty, may not suffice when analyzing emerging markets. Lack of information systems and weak legal systems (i.e., weak law enforcement in courts) increase search, monitoring and enforcement costs in emerging markets (Meyer and Peng, 2005) . Moreover, regulatory ambiguity and corruption tends to be pervasive, which makes opportunistic behaviors of business partners in emerging markets difficult to identify and to constrain (Choi, Lee and Kim, 1999; Li and Meyer, 2009 ). However, capturing such environmental characteristics is a major challenge for empirical research.
In multi-country studies, the environmental features that drive TC have been captured by indices of institutional development. For example, Meyer (2001) Despite these differences in methodologies, this stream of research provides fairly strong evidence that institutions in emerging markets shape the TCs. However, how, why and which institutions matter still remains an area of divergent interpretations and theorizing. Hence, future studies probing into emerging markets should consider how the external environment moderates TCs, for instance by probing deeper to identify which aspects of institutions matter, especially with respect to institutions that vary within countries -e.g. across industries or across provinces.
Moreover, the interaction between environmental and firm-level characteristics merits further research building on Meyer et al. (2009), and Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007) . Finally, even studies that do not focus on contextual variations in their theorizing need to be acutely aware of the importance of institutional influences because it not only requires appropriate controls, but may limit the generalizability of single context studies.
The Theoretical Ambiguity of Effects of Experience and Distance
Two variables have been particularly prominent in the TCE literature on JVs and strategic alliances: "experience" and "distance" (Andersson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Meyer, 2001) . They exist in many variations, such as the length and breadth of experience in a particular country, or worldwide (Li and Meyer, 2009; Clarke et al., 2013) , or as distance between the home and host countries in terms of culture, geography, administration, or economic development. The theoretical argument is that that experience is expected to reduce internal uncertainty, whereas distance tends to increased internal uncertainty, both of which increase the cost of market transactions. In other words, the likelihood of running into problems with business partners due to opportunistic behaviors is larger the greater the differences are between host and home country, and the less experienced a firm is in the host country.
How does this effect influence entry mode choice? The mainstream argument suggests that WOS by distant or inexperienced investors would face these increased TCs in their relationships with local suppliers, distributors or customer. A local JV partner would have local knowledge, and therefore face substantially lower costs in managing transactions with local businesses. Hence, it has frequently been hypothesized that high distance and low experience are associated with investors establishing a JV rather than a WOS (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988 , Erramilli and Rao, 1993 , Agarwal, 1994 , Hennart and Larimo, 1998 , Taylor et al., 1998 . This argument however is fundamentally flawed, and suggests an incomplete understanding of TCE! Decisions over organizational forms are, according to TCE, based on the costs of using the market relative to using an internal form of organizing (Hennart, 1988; Li and Meyer, 2009) or, in this case, a strategic alliance. The word 'relative' is important here. In the above theoretical arguments, esteemed theorists assume that their focal variable, distance or experience, impacts on the cost of using the market but they neglect the impact of the same explanatory variable on the alternative form of organizing. In fact, distance and lack of experience increase many aspects of doing business, for example search and contract enforcements (i.e. costs associated with markets), coordination and decision coordination costs (i.e. costs associated especially with joint ventures), as well as costs of hiring, monitoring and incentivizing local employees (i.e. costs associated especially with WOS). Hence, distance and lack of experience increase the costs of any form of organizing, not just the TCs of using the market.
This ambiguity is particularly evident in the case of JVs. Foreign investors with limited experience are often advised to use JVs to lower the costs of accessing local knowledge and relationships. However, their lack of experience will also make it more costly to select an appropriate partner, and to manage the relationship with that partner. Experienced firms are able to select an appropriate partner and to better manage JVs, which in turn, increases the probability to opt for JVs (Li and Meyer, 2009) . This is to suggest that experience, on one hand, reduces the need for a local partner and hence encourages foreign investors to establish WOS. On the other hand, experience facilitates cooperation between foreign investors and local partners. The same argument can be made for distance.
TCE explanations of organizational form are always about the TCs of external markets (i.e., searching, monitoring and enforcement costs) relative to internal coordination (i.e., training, staffing and communication). The constructs of experience and cultural distance simultaneously affect external and internal costs in the same direction. Hence, the impact of distance and lack of experience depends on the relative strength of the relationship between these constructs and costs of using respectively internal or external coordination. The theory does not tell which of these effects is stronger. Therefore, we have to conclude that properly applied TCE does not allow us to predict the relationship between distance, experience and foreign entry mode choice. The relationship between distance/experience and the choice of organizational form is theoretically ambiguous.
Researchers can, however, explore under which conditions either of the impact is likely to be stronger. In other words, the relative importance of the effect on respectively internal and external organizational forms is contingent on type of experience, the local context of the operation and MNE's own context (Figure 1 ). For example, Li and Meyer (2009) find that the positive relationship between general IB experience and the choice of high-control (i.e., WOS) as opposed to low-control organizational forms (i.e., JVs) is stronger in developed economies, whereas the negative impact of country specific experience on the needs to obtain high level of control is stronger in developing countries. Such types of contingencies provide opportunities to advance TCE research because they allow investigating the interdependence between external and internal factors shaping TCs in a particular market. *** Figure 1 here ***
JVs Do not Enhance Flexibility
International business scholars often implicitly assume that a JV is a less risky and more flexible organizational form than a WOS when operating in volatile and uncertain market (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Erramilli and Rao, 1993) .
Despite advantages of JVs such as lower resource commitment and shared costs and risks, JVs suffer from internal risks such as conflicts between the parent firms. JVs are based on long-term contracts such that one of the JV partners cannot simply abandon the relationship (Meyer and Tran, 2006) . Moreover, any strategic decision in the JV requires mutual agreement between the parent firms. Even if a foreign investor owns a substantial majority equity stake, they need the cooperation of the local partner to rarely push through proposed strategic actions. A local partner 20 attains influence not only through its equity stake, but indirectly through people delegated to work in the JV, through relationships with external stakeholders (say, trade unions, or government officials), and possibly through ownership of key assets such as real estate or distribution channels. Hence, characteristics other than ownership, such as trust between the partners, become critical for the effective management of a JV (Madhok, 2006) . Without that, JV is a highly inflexible mode of operating because the foreign investor is constrained in making strategic changes. The time the parent firms need to react to radical internal and external environment change is bound to be longer (Peng and Meyer, 2011) .
The idea that a majority owner in a JV enjoys full control over a joint venture is an illusion that unfortunately is common in the ivory towers of academia. Yet, this assumption is very far from the realities of JVs in emerging economies. The autobiographies by Leblanc (2008) what happens in a JV. Hence, many aspects of TCs are in fact higher in JVs than that in either market transactions or in hierarchies, especially the opportunity costs of coordination failure, or of slow response to emergent market opportunities. Table 3 highlights the risks related to four types of equity modes of entry: wholly-owned greenfields, full acquisitions, newly established JV and partial acquisition. Newly established JVs suffer less from investments risk due to lower capital commitment, and normally no postestablishment integration risk (unless parts of an existing operation are moved to the new operation, as was common in Vietnam as certain times, Nguyen and Meyer, 2004) . However, they are highly exposed to coordination risk and hence more likely to miss emergent market opportunities because they are too slow to react. Investors in partial acquisitions face limited investments risk due to low capital investments, however, partial acquisitions are exposed to high risks of integration problems and conflicts between co-owners (Meyer and Tran, 2006) .
Hence, the JVs are only low risk in the sense that the maximum financial loss is less compared to owing the same size operation outright. Full acquisition and greenfield operations may require more investment up-front (and higher financial risks), but they are in fact more flexible to react to changing environments.
*** Table 3 here ***
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
TCE provides a very developed and sophisticated foundation for the analysis of the choice of organizational forms, and strategic alliances in particular. It has become the most commonly used theoretical approach to analyze the merits of cross-border JVs relative to alternative organizational forms such as arm-length markets, contractual arrangements (i.e., licensing, franchising) and WOS. However, the empirical evidence for core TCE constructs such as asset specificity and (internal and external) uncertainty is far from satisfactory. We attribute this to four challenges arising for empirical testing of TCE (Table 4) . While our review focused on tests of TCE based on empirical analyses of ownership choices, similar challenges also pertain to TCE informed studies of JV performance (Lu and Hé bert, 2005; Chang, Chung and Moon, 2013) and of ownership change (Puck, Holtbrügge and Mohr, 2009 ).
*** Table 4 here *** Third, many TCE studies assume that the market is relatively static and well developed, and hence, TCs do not vary within the sample due to variations in the external environment. These assumptions may not hold true for emerging economies, and therefore, characteristics of firms may not be very effective to capture transaction cost drivers in countries such as CEE and China.
Weak information and legal systems increase search, monitoring and enforcement costs (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Luo, 2007) , while regulatory ambiguity and corruption tend to increase external uncertainty in emerging markets (Li and Meyer, 2009 ). These environmental influences can be studied directly, controlled for through control variables, or assumed only to create random noise in a given dataset. Clearly, we find the latter approach unsatisfactory. Researchers studying JVs in emerging markets may thus want to examine how the external environment moderates TCs.
Finally, most of TCE based studies implicitly assume that JVs are a flexible organizational form, and hence, MNEs prefer to use JVs as opposed to WOS to enter high risk environments. 
TCE constructs Propositions
Transaction specific assets 1) Highly proprietary products and processes (+)
2) Unstructured and poorly understood products and processes (+)
3) Customized products (+)
4) Immature products (+)
External uncertainty 1) Country risk (non-significant)
2) Country risk X transaction specific assets (+)
Internal uncertainty 1) International experience (+)
2) Socio-cultural distance (-)
Free-riding potential Valuable brand name (+) + = increase the need for high control mode. 1) Cultural distance is positively associated with the choice of JVs, whereas country risk and market potential increases the probability to opt for WOS.
2) The strength of the positive relationship between cultural distance and JVs is reduced for MNEs with high degree of multinationality. Erramilli (1996) 337 US, France, and UK advertising firms before 1991 Majority JV, equal JV, minority JV and non-equity modes Home country power distance index, Home country uncertainty avoidance index, Home country market size, Parent firm size, Multinationality, Size of foreign subsidiary, Host market size, Cultural distance, Host government ownership restrictions Industry and country level proxies (archival data) 1) Home country power distance and uncertainty avoidance increases the preference of majority ownership.
2) The use of majority ownership increases as home market size increases, but this relationship becomes weaker as parent firm size increases.
3) The use of majority JV increases as the size of host markets, parent firms and foreign subsidiaries increase, and decreases as the degree of multi-nationality and host government ownership restrictions increase. Padmanabhan & Cho (1996) 839 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries worldwide between 1969-1991 WOS and JVs R&D intensity, International experience, Cultural distance, Host country experience, Parent firm size, Subsidiary size, Relatedness of investment, Government restriction.
Firm and country level proxies (archival data) 1) Parent's familiarity with host country, R&D intensity and cultural distance has positive influence on the Japanese firms 'choice of WOS. 2) Government restriction has a negative influence on WOS.
Erramilli et al. Firm level proxy (archival data) 1) Technological intensity and more developed economies are positively associated with higher-equity modes, whereas diversification increases the probability to choose lower-equity modes.
2) The impact of technological intensity, diversification and capital intensity on ownership are contingent on host country factors (developed vs. less developed economies) Contractor & Kundu (1998) 1) U.S. firms tend to choose high control modes when the host market potential is high, when it is difficult to receive a fair price, when the frequency of transactions is high and when the size of the firm is large.
2) While TCE variables help to explain U.S. firms' choice of JVs versus WOS, they do not explain the choice of JVs by Japanese investors. Delios and Beamish (1999) 1424 Japanese firms in East and South-East Asia before 1994
Equity share (5% -100%) Contributed assets (R&D intensity, advertising intensity), Complementary assets (Resource intensive industry, Relatedness, Relative size of subsidiary to its parent), Institutional environment (Country risk, Government restrictions, Intellectual property protection), International experience (export intensity, number of foreign investments, year of host country experience, Sogo Shosha as partner) Firm, industry and country level proxies (archival data) 1) R&D/advertising intensity of industry entered, relative size, intellectual property protection, export intensity and year of host country experience are positively associated with Japanese ownership levels. 2) resource-intensive industry, government restrictions and partnership with Sogo Shosha decrease the Japanese ownership level. Palenzuela & Bobillo (1999) 
